

18 MAR 1998

Ref: 94-F-2655 (A)

Mr. William Burr
The National Security Archive
Gelman Library, Suite 701
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Burr:

This responds to your June 24, 1997, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal of the response provided to you by the Department of State (DoS) in the above referenced case. This Directorate's July 14, 1997, interim response; DoS case #9201908; and your case #941126DOD164, refer.

As a result of your FOIA appeal, a second review of the appealed document was conducted. As the appealed document is herein provided, your FOIA appeal is considered moot.

Sincerely,




A. H. Passarella
Director

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
Department of State

CYT:mml:4f2655A:2/27/98:DFOI:X74026:gr_pk_y1_wh



to R/E

#920

file: NSDM-49



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DOD

April 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: SALT OPTIONS

Attached is the final draft of the four detailed SALT options called for in NSDM-49, as prepared by the Working Group, for discussion by the Verification Panel on April 6.

Raymond L. Garthoff
Raymond L. Garthoff
Department of State

Attachment:
SALT OPTIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date: 12/1/84
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<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
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FOIA Exemptions _____		
PA Exemptions _____		
		TS authority to:
		<i>W. L. Garthoff</i>
		() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
		(X) DOWNGRADE TS to (X) S or () C OADR

GROUP 1.
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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SALT OPTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In accordance with NSDM 49, four options are outlined below: Option A ("Limited"); Option B ("Comprehensive I"); Option C ("Comprehensive II"); and Option D ("Reduction").

Verification requirements and provisions are presented in the course of the discussion of each system within each option; in addition, a general summary presentation of verification provisions is set forth at the close of the section outlining each option.

For the most part, subsidiary issues have been resolved in the same way in all options, in an attempt to focus attention on the major issues requiring decision. Thus, the same provisions with respect to ICBMs and SLBMs apply in Options A, B, and C. MR/IRBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers are treated in the same way in all four options. ABM limitations are the same in Options B and C, and D has as alternatives the Option A or Option B-C levels. MIRV and qualitative limitations are the same in Options A, B, and D. (While the basic provisions for limitation are the same in many cases, as noted above, in a few instances the over-all context of limitations is such that discussion and treatment of some corollary limitations and verification considerations vary slightly from case to case.)

The options are presented in detail considered appropriate to serve for evaluation of the options as possible outcomes of negotiation, and as the basis for a concrete US proposal. In a few cases where it is appropriate, reference has been made to fall-back changes of position. The paper does not, however, deal with negotiating tactics or negotiating strategy, even in general terms.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-ii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Introduction</u>	i
<u>Option A: A "Limited" Agreement</u>	1
1. ICBMs and SLBMs.....	1
2. MR/IRBMs.....	5
3. SLCMs.....	7
4. ABMs.....	8
5. Development Testing, Training and Space Launchers.	15
6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)..	16
7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements.....	17
8. Verification.....	17
<u>Option B: "Comprehensive I" Agreement</u>	20
1. ICBMs and SLBMs.....	20
2. MR/IRBMs.....	24
3. SLCMs.....	26
4. ABMs.....	27
5. Development Testing, Training and Space Launchers.	36
6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)..	36
7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements.....	38
8. Verification.....	38
<u>Option C: "Comprehensive II" Agreement</u>	41
1. ICBMs and SLBMs.....	41
2. MR/IRBMs.....	45
3. SLCMs.....	47
4. ABMs.....	48
5. Development Testing, Training and Space Launchers.	57
6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)..	57
7. MIRVs.....	60
8. Qualitative Improvements.....	62
9. Verification.....	63

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-iii-

Page

<u>Option D: A "Reduction" Agreement.....</u>	65
1. ICBMs and SLBMs.....	65
2. MR/IRBMs.....	70
3. SLCMs.....	72
4. ABMs.....	73
5. Development Testing, Training and Space Launchers.	74
6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers) ..	74
7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements.....	77
8. Verification.....	77

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-1-

Option A: A "Limited" Agreement

1. ICBMs and SLBMs

Limitations

The aggregate total of ICBM and SLBM* launchers would be limited to 1,710.** At the present time, the Soviet Union has operational 1,272 ICBMs--of which 222 are SS-9's--and 288 SLEM launchers, for a total of 1,560. However, others under construction would if completed raise the total to nearly 2,000. A ceiling of 1,710 represents the US total, and would mean that the Soviets could complete roughly half of what they now have under construction. In order to avoid Soviet completion of all its SS-9's under construction--60--we would seek an understanding that completion would be approximately proportional

* The JCS Representative believes that instead of specifying SLBM launchers, "sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers" should be specified throughout the discussion of limitations in this section. This would allow inclusion of strategic offensive ballistic missiles mounted on surface ships within the mix.

** The JCS Representative believes that as an alternative or starting position we should suggest the formula "a total equal to the number operational as of a specified date (e.g., July 1, 1970)."

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within classes of launchers under construction, so that the Soviet "SS-9 ceiling" within the 1,710 total would be 250.*

Within the ceiling of 1,710 launchers, SLBM launchers could be substituted for existing fixed land-based ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.** Existing SLBM launchers could be replaced by other SLBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

ICBM launchers could not be relocated or modified in externally observable ways.***

Deployment and testing of land-mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be prohibited.****

Deployment and testing of strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships would be prohibited.***** Strategic

* The OSD Representative believes we should also specify that after some given date in 1970 no more than 250 missiles greater than 65 cubic meters in volume would be permitted (in effect, forcing Soviet replacement by small missiles or reduction of the 220 SS-7 and SS-8 missiles on launchers).

** The JCS Representative believes there should be interchangeable two-way freedom to alter the mix between fixed land-based and sea-based launchers.

The OSD Representative believes that the sequence of possible permissible reductions of land-based ICBM launchers should be specified, requiring phasing out of older ICBMs first.

*** The JCS Representative believes that there should be no restriction on relocation of ICBM launchers.

The OSD Representative would prefer to say ICBM launchers could not be enlarged, but externally observable changes which would not enlarge the launcher would be permitted.

**** The OSD Representative believes testing and deployment of land-mobile ICBMs should not be banned.

***** The JCS Representative, as noted earlier, believes strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships should not be banned. The OSD Representative believes testing of such systems should not be banned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

offensive missiles mounted on waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited.

There would be no limitation on replacement of ICBM missiles by other ICBM missiles.*

ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers. ICBMs, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as part of the total number of ICBM/ SLBM launchers. (The Soviets have deployed 40 SS-11 ICBMs in one MRBM and one IRBM complex, and are so deploying another 40 at those complexes.)

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited. **

Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would be considered as part of the allowed total number of launchers.

* See the first footnote of the OSD Representative on the preceding page.

** The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe testing of this system should be limited.

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-4-

Corollary Limitations

Several supporting corollary limitations would be included in order to facilitate verification.

No additional MR/IRBM silos (beyond the 135 extant) would be allowed, since ICBMs could be retrofitted into such launchers, and this might elude detection.

No mobile missile of length greater than twelve meters and diameter of one and one-half meters or TELs for such missiles would be allowed, in order to prevent claims that an ICBM was a shorter-range permitted missile.

There would also be agreed procedures for notification and implementation of permitted launcher destruction and replacement, in order to ensure verification of changes in the mix of launchers.

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

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2. MR/IRBMsLimitations

The number of MR/IRBM launchers would be limited to the number currently operational (the USSR has 650; the US has none). Relocation of MR/IRBM launchers or externally observable modifications of such launchers would be prohibited. Deployment and testing of land-based mobile MR/IRBMs would be prohibited, and any operational would be destroyed.*

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intermediate or medium range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.*

Missiles of medium and intermediate range would be defined as missiles with a maximum range greater than 1,000 and less than 5,000 kilometers.

Corollary Limitations

Limitations would be placed on the size of mobile missiles and TELs for such missiles, including some with range capabilities of less than 1,000 kilometers, in order to insure against

* The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe that limitation should be placed on testing of these missile systems.

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-6-

evasion of the ban on mobile MR/IRBMs. Such missiles (with nosecone) would be limited to a length of twelve meters and a diameter of one and one-fourth meters.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

If Soviet opposition to limitations on MR/IRBMs remains adamant, we should, subject to consultation with our NATO Allies on changing our position, be prepared to agree to set aside or defer limitations on MR/IRBMs, in exchange for appropriate Soviet concessions. Those restrictions on MR/IRBMs pertinent to insuring ICBM limitations are, however, separately specified as corollary limitations integral to the ICBM/SLBM limitations, and would continue to be maintained.

(New MR/IRBM silos would still be banned. Mobile offensive missiles below the size limits required for the ICBM corollary restriction would, however, be allowed if the MR/IRBM limitation were set aside.)

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-7-

3. SLCMs

Limitations

Submarines and associated launchers for SLCMs would be limited to those currently operational (the USSR has 348 launchers; the US has none).^{*} Substitution of SLBM launchers for SLCM launchers would not be permitted.

Corollary Limitation

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

We would initially seek the above limitation on SLCMs, but would be prepared in the negotiations to set aside limitations on SLCMs in exchange for some appropriate Soviet concession.

* The JCS and OSD Representatives believe we should seek an agreed number, so that the US would have the option of building up to 348 SLCM launchers.

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4. ABMs*Limitations

The number of ABM launchers would be limited to a total of 1,000, of all types, and there would be agreed limitations on the number and location of ABM radars.**

ABM-associated radars would be distinguished from other radars by agreed criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical-scan). It would be necessary to negotiate precisely an agreed understanding with respect to existing radars which have or could have an ABM-related role. In the Soviet case, this would involve at least the Hen House, Dog House (and similar), and Try Add radar complexes. The location of future ABM radars would be declared in advance.

* The OSD Representative would prefer an alternative approach to limiting ABMs; namely, a system of limitation on "aerospace defense" systems generally, whether intended for defense against bombers or missiles. Under this approach defense missiles and radars would be divided into several classes by observable characteristics, and separate limits would be placed on numbers of missiles and radars permitted in each class, regardless of whether they are described or regarded as ABMs or SAMs. This approach is discussed in more detail in the section appended at pp. 12-14.

** The JCS Representative believes this paragraph should read: "Ballistic missile defenses would be limited to a total of no more than 1,000 ABM launchers and no more than 1,000 associated interceptors; ABM radars would not be limited. The OSD Representative also believes the limitation should be couched in terms of 1,000 launchers and 1,000 associated interceptors.

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-9-

There would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. (For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array radar for air traffic control at Moscow we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; in that case it would not be necessary to apply other criteria dealing with the performance characteristics of the radar. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor we would be able to insist on application of other criteria appropriate to the situation in order to rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role.) The Soviets, of course, could similarly insist we handle future non-ABM radar needs in ways which did not permit us to acquire ABM capabilities.

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-10-

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual antiaircraft and anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Deployment and testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.*

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side would declare its ABM systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not include antiaircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk.**

- * The JCS Representative believes no limitations should be placed on mobile ABM systems; the OSD Representative believes land-mobile ABMs should not be prohibited.
- ** The JCS and OSD Representatives believe this understanding would have to be sufficiently broad to encompass not only pure ABM systems, but also ABM capabilities of SAMs.

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-11-

Corollary Limitations*

The testing of SAMs in an ABM mode would be prohibited. **

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed ABM systems, and of new SAM systems. ***

to limit

We would seek/ SAM radars constructed in the future to uncovered dish-type mechanically-steered non-phased-array radars. ****

* If this approach is adopted, the OSD Representative believes the following constraints would be mandatory:

1. All phased array radars over $5M^2$ except those designated as ABM are prohibited without prior notice or understanding as to purpose and location.

2. New aerospace interceptors except those designated as ABMs (and their launchers) which are larger than $1M^3$ are prohibited.

3. The performance of existing aerospace interceptors except those designated as ABMs cannot be increased by more than 20% in range, acceleration, burnout velocity or payload and cannot have nuclear warheads.

4. The numbers of each type of presently deployed SAM radars and interceptors cannot be increased by more than 20% beyond those currently under construction.

5. SA-5 radars and interceptors cannot be deployed closer than 50 miles of the largest 200 Soviet cities and the SA-2 components within 10 miles.

6. Non-phased-array radars greater than $10M^2$ combined total aperture, except those designed as ABM, cannot be equipped so as to be able to track ICBMs and SLBMs.

** The OSD Representative does not believe such testing should be prohibited.

*** The JCS Representative would delete this provision on advance notification.

**** The JCS and OSD Representatives would delete the restriction on upgrading SAM radars.

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-12-

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.*

OSD Alternative to Section 4

Aerospace Defense Equivalency

Limitations

Interceptors

The number of aerospace (ABM and SAM) defense interceptors would be limited to:

<u>Area</u>	500 Equivalent Area Interceptors
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<u>Terminal</u>	2 500 Equivalent Terminal Interceptors
-----------------	---

<u>Point</u>	Unlimited
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with the classes defined below.

Radar

The number of aerospace defense radars are limited to:

<u>Acquisition</u>	16 Equivalent Warning/Acquisition Phased Array Faces
--------------------	---

* The JCS Representative would insert "primarily" after "accomplished." He also believes that on-site inspection would currently be required to provide assurance that SAMs did not have an ABM capability and that SAMs are not tested in an ABM mode. Furthermore, the JCS Representative reserves on means required to verify ABM radar limitations in the absence of specific numerical parameters defining these limitations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-13-

Engagement 50 Equivalent Engagement Radar Complexes

Small Unlimited
Acquisition
& Engagement

and are defined below.

Definitions and Equivalency

Interceptors

An equivalent aerospace defensive interceptor is defined in two time increments in order to account for the differences between the technology of deployed systems and systems to be deployed:

Long Term Equivalency, for the period after 1975, would be negotiated by 1975. At that time, the US would propose that:

Area aerospace interceptors be defined to have a volume exceeding 5 meters³.

Terminal aerospace interceptors be defined to have a volume exceeding 1 meter³ but less than 5 meters³.

Point aerospace interceptors are defined to have a volume less than 1 meter³.

Near Term Equivalency, through 1975, would be set at:

1 Area Aerospace Interceptor = 1 Galosh Missile
= 1 Spartan Missile

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-14-

1 Terminal Aerospace	=	1 Sprint Missile
Interceptor	=	2 Hercules Missiles
	=	2 SA-5 Missiles
	=	11 SA-2 Missiles
	(1 site)	
	=	Unlimited SA-1
		Missiles

Radars

Equivalent Early Warning/Acquisition
(Phased Array Faces Greater than $100M^2$)

1 PAR = 1 Henhouse - 1 Doghouse

Equivalent Engagement Radar Complexes
(Phased Array Radar Faces between 5 and $100M^2$
or non-phased array radars between 40 and $100M^2$)

1 MSR = 1 Try Add Complex = 20 SA-5 Engagement
Radars
= 20 Hercules Engagement Sets

Small Acquisition and Engagement Radars
(Phased Array Radar Faces less than $5M^2$ or
non-phased array radars less than $40M^2$)

This approach takes as its point of departure the Soviet SAM system. An equivalent US aerospace defense system limit has been computed based on a consideration of the Soviet SAM system in terms of interceptors and radars.

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5. Development Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Limitation

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic missile systems, and for space missions, would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 125 launchers.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Verification would be facilitated by agreement to provide a list of such launch facilities and their locations, but this would not be mandatory.*

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations **

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational.*** This category would be defined as

* The JCS Representative believes such declaration of facilities should be mandatory.

** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be bomber limitations.

*** The OSD Representative believes the numbers above should be specified, rather than expressed in terms of "currently operational" numbers.

The JCS Representative believes that if bombers are to be limited, the numbers indicated should be specified.

presently comprising B-52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The US at present has 527 B-52 bombers; the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)*

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

No limitations would be placed on armament of any kind carried by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems

* The OSD Representative believes that, as a separate and additional category, medium strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising Badger, Blinder, and FB-111 bombers. (The US now has 33 FB-111's and is building to 76; the USSR has 1,275 Badger and Blinder bombers.) He would also include 50 additional Bear aircraft used in naval reconnaissance in the heavy bomber total.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-17-

specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs. Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.*

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements

Limitations

There would be no limitations on MIRVs, nor on qualitative improvements of strategic missile systems except as specified in provisions outlined above.

8. Verification

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option A would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of mandatory

* The JCS Representative believes that if bombers were to be limited, air defenses should be limited also or the viability of a limited bomber force could be challenged by an extensive defense build-up.

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corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions
compatible with our verification capabilities. *

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework

* The JCS Representative believes that while primary reliance would be placed upon national means of verification, in addition to the mandatory corollary restraints on-site inspection should be sought in those circumstances and for those limitations where necessary for verification of compliance.

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-19-

of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event neither party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

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Option B: "Comprehensive I" Agreement

1. ICBMs and SLBMs

Limitations

The aggregate total of ICBM and SLBM* launchers would be limited to 1,710.** At the present time, the Soviet Union has operational 1,272 ICBMs--of which 222 are SS-9's--and 288 SLBM launchers, for a total of 1,560. However, others under construction would if completed raise the total to nearly 2,000. A ceiling of 1,710 represents the US total, and would mean that the Soviets could complete roughly half of what they now have under construction. In order to avoid Soviet completion of all its SS-9's under construction--60--we would seek an understanding that completion would be approximately proportional

* The JCS Representative believes that instead of specifying SLBM launchers, "sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers" should be specified throughout the discussion of limitations in this section. This would allow inclusion of strategic offensive ballistic missiles mounted on surface ships within the mix.

** The JCS Representative believes that as an alternative or starting position we should suggest the formula "a total equal to the number operational as of a specified date (e.g., July 1, 1970)."

within classes of launchers under construction, so that the Soviet "SS-9 ceiling" within the 1,710 total would be 250.**

Within the ceiling of 1,710 launchers, SLBM launchers could be substituted for existing fixed land-based ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.** Existing SLBM launchers could be replaced by other SLBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

ICBM launchers could not be relocated or modified in externally observable ways.***

Deployment and testing of land-mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be prohibited.****

Deployment and testing of strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships would be prohibited.***** Strategic

- * The OSD Representative believes we should also specify that after some given date in 1970 no more than 250 missiles greater than 65 cubic meters in volume would be permitted (in effect, forcing Soviet replacement by small missiles or reduction of the 220 SS-7 and SS-8 missiles on launchers).
- ** The JCS Representative believes there should be interchangeable two-way freedom to alter the mix between fixed land-based and sea-based launchers.
The OSD Representative believes that the sequence of possible permissible reductions of land-based ICBM launchers should be specified, requiring phasing out of older ICBMs first.
- *** The JCS Representative believes that there should be no restriction on relocation of ICBM launchers.
The OSD Representative would prefer to say ICBM launchers could not be enlarged, but externally observable changes which would not enlarge the launcher would be permitted.
- **** The OSD Representative believes testing and deployment of land-mobile ICBMs should not be banned.
- ***** The JCS Representative, as noted earlier, believes strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships should not be banned.
The OSD Representative believes testing of such systems should not be banned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-22-

offensive missiles mounted on waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited.

There would be no limitation on replacement of ICBM missiles by other ICBM missiles.*

ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers.

ICBMs, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as part of the total number of ICBM/SLBM launchers. (The Soviets have deployed 40 SS-11 ICBMs in one MRBM and one IRBM complex, and are so deploying another 40 at those complexes.)

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.**

Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would be considered as part of the allowed total number of launchers.

* See the first footnote of the OSD Representative on the preceding page.

** The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe testing of this system should be limited.

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-23-

Corollary Limitations

Several supporting corollary limitations would be included in order to facilitate verification.

No additional MR/IRBM silos (beyond the 135 extant) would be allowed, since ICBMs could be retrofitted into such launchers, and this might elude detection.

No mobile missile of length greater than twelve meters and diameter of one and one-half meters or TELs for such missiles would be allowed, in order to prevent claims that an ICBM was a shorter-range permitted missile.

There would also be agreed procedures for notification and implementation of permitted launcher destruction and replacement, in order to ensure verification of changes in the mix of launchers.

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

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2. MR/IRBMsLimitations

The number of MR/IRBM launchers would be limited to the number currently operational (the USSR has 650; the US has none). Relocation of MR/IRBM launchers or externally observable modifications of such launchers would be prohibited. Deployment and testing of land-based mobile MR/IRBMs would be prohibited, and any operational would be destroyed.*

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intermediate or medium range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.*

Missiles of medium and intermediate range would be defined as missiles with a maximum range greater than 1,000 and less than 5,000 kilometers.

Corollary Limitations

Limitations would be placed on the size of mobile missiles and TELs for such missiles, including some with range capabilities of less than 1,000 kilometers, in order to insure against

* The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe that limitation should be placed on testing of these missile systems.

evasion of the ban on mobile MR/IRBMs. Such missiles (with nosecone) would be limited to a length of twelve meters and a diameter of one and one-fourth meters.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

If Soviet opposition to limitations on MR/IRBMs remains adamant, we should, subject to consultation with our NATO Allies on changing our position, be prepared to agree to set aside or defer limitations on MR/IRBMs, in exchange for appropriate Soviet concessions. Those restrictions on MR/IRBMs pertinent to insuring ICBM limitations are, however, separately specified as corollary limitations integral to the ICBM/SLBM limitations, and would continue to be maintained.

(New MR/IRBM silos would still be banned. Mobile offensive missiles below the size limits required for the ICBM corollary restriction would, however, be allowed if the MR/IRBM limitation were set aside.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-26-

3. SLCMs

Limitations

Submarines and associated launchers for SLCMs would be limited to those currently operational (the USSR has 348 launchers; the US has none). * Substitution of SLBM launchers for SLCM launchers would not be permitted.

Corollary Limitation

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

We would initially seek the above limitation on SLCMs, but would be prepared in the negotiations to set aside limitations on SLCMs in exchange for some appropriate Soviet concession.

* The JCS and OSD Representatives believe we should seek an agreed number, so that the US would have the option of building up to 348 SLCM launchers.

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4. ABMs

Two alternatives for ABM limitation under this option are considered: zero or NCA levels.

(a) Zero ABM Level Limitation

Deployment of ABM launchers would be prohibited, and existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its existing Moscow Galosh ABM defenses. Specifically, the USSR would within three months of the time the agreement came into effect dismantle the Dog House radar, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four Try Add radar complexes, and the 64-launcher complex around Moscow. (Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces; launchers would be dismantled by removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch pads. Interceptors could be used for R&D testing.)* The US would also propose that the Soviets dismantle the uncompleted Hen House radar near Sevastopol. The Soviets

* The OSD Representative believes that all interceptors should be destroyed.

could keep the Skrunda and Olenegorsk large early-warning and tracking Hen House radars, and the Sary Shagan and Mishelevka early-warning, test range and space-track Hen House radars in Siberia, some faces of which face the Chinese missile threat, including portions of those radar complexes still under construction.*

The US would cancel Safeguard deployment. No existing US radars would be destroyed. We could retain or replace the three large BMEWs early-warning radars, and the large phased-array space-track radar at Eglin AFB, Florida (as well as the MSR ABM test radar at Kwajalein). This would provide rough equivalence of early-warning radar coverage to the two sides.**

- * The OSD Representative believes the USSR must dismantle all the Hen House radars, except for the radar faces at Sary Shagan and Mishelevka not facing the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean for space-tracking, and believe we should be prepared to give up the BMEWs in exchange.
- ** The JCS Representative would permit Soviet retention of all the Hen House radars for space-tracking and early-warning, in exchange for the US right to comparable radar coverage, but does not agree that the remaining radar systems above are comparable.
The OSD Representative also does not agree that the remaining radar system above are comparable.

(If the Soviets insisted on building the Sevastopol radar for early-warning, the US would retain the right to build a radar or radars providing comparable additional coverage for early-warning.)

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual antiaircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role.* Apart from agreement on the disposition of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to an ABM system, as specified above, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. Non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by agreed criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan). (For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array

* The JCS Representative does not believe that limitations on ABM radars are feasible, and therefore does not believe that ABM radars should be limited.

radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; it would then not be necessary to apply other criteria. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist that an application of other criteria appropriate to the situation rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role.)

ABM research, development, and testing would be permitted. All flight-testing would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight-tests, (b) not more than 25 per year, (c) on not more than 10 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges.*

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM", but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side will declare its systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not

* The OSD and JCS Representatives believe no restriction should be placed on ABM R&D flight-testing.

include antiaircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk. *

Corollary Limitations **

There would be a ban on flight-testing of SAMs in an ABM mode.

- * The JCS and OSD Representatives believe this understanding would have to be sufficiently broad to encompass not only pure ABM systems, but also ABM capabilities of SAMs.
- ** If this approach is adopted, the OSD Representative believes the following constraints would be mandatory:
 1. All phased-array radars over $5M^2$ except those designated as ABM are prohibited without prior notice or understanding as to purpose and location.
 2. New aerospace interceptors except those designated as ABMs (and their launchers) which are larger than $1M^3$ are prohibited.
 3. The performance of existing aerospace interceptors except those designated ABMs, cannot be increased by more than 20% in range, acceleration, burnout velocity or payload, and cannot have nuclear warheads.
 4. The numbers of each type of presently deployed SAM radars and interceptors cannot be increased by more than 20% beyond those currently under construction.
 5. SA-5 radars and interceptors cannot be deployed closer than 50 miles of the largest 200 Soviet cities and the SA-2 components within 10 miles.
 6. Non-phased-array radars greater than $10M^2$ combined total aperture, except those designated as ABM, cannot be equipped so as to be able to track ICBMs and SLBMs.
- *** The JCS Representative believes on-site inspection would currently be required to verify the ban on SAM flight-testing in an ABM mode.

We would seek to limit SAM radars constructed in the future to uncovered dish-type mechanically-steered non-phased-array
* radars.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of
** allowed SAM systems.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the above corollary
*** limitations.

The US can verify the dismantling of the existing Soviet ABM system as described herein.

- * The JCS and OSD Representatives would delete the restriction on upgrading SAM radars.
- ** The JCS Representative would delete this provision on advance notification.
- *** The JCS Representative would insert "primarily" after "accomplished." He also believes that on-site inspection would currently be required to provide assurance that SAMs did not have an ABM capability and that SAMs are not tested in an ABM mode. Furthermore, the JCS Representative reserves on means required to verify ABM radar limitations in the absence of specific numerical parameters defining these limitations.

(b) NCA Defense ABM Level Limitation*

Deployment of ABMs would be limited to those appropriate to a defense of the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington). One hundred ABM launchers of any type would be permitted, together with associated radars. **

The Soviet Union would retain its present radars and ABM launchers, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated radars around Moscow. (We would seek the dismantling

* The OSD Representative prefers the alternate approach on ABM which is based on the equivalency of aerospace (ABM and SAM) defenses, as described in Option A.

For the NCA defense level case this would correspond to:
Interceptors

Area	100 Equivalent Interceptors
Terminal	2500 Equivalent Interceptors
Point	Unlimited
<u>Radars</u>	
Acquisition	16 Equivalent Warning/Acquisition Phased Array Faces
Engagement	50 Equivalent Engagement Radar Complexes
Small Acquisition & Engagement	Unlimited

** The JCS Representative believes the limitation should read "Ballistic missile defense would be limited to no more than 100 launchers and to no more than 100 interceptors; there would be no limitation on ABM radars."

of the Sevastopol Hen House, as in the case of the zero ABM level, with the same alternative fall-back of a comparable radar or radars for the US as a counterpart if Sevastopol is retained.)

The US would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising one PAR, one MSR, and 100 ABM launchers centered on a defense of the Washington, D.C., area (but covering a large area of the eastern United States).*

The provision with respect to future non-ABM radars outlined in the discussion of zero ABM levels (on pp. 29-30 above) would apply.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual antiaircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

ABM research, development and testing would be permitted. In addition, confidence firings would be permitted. All such ABM interceptor flight tests and confidence firings would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 30 per year, (c) on not more than 15 launchers,

* The OSD Representative believes that the equivalent system would be 100 interceptors, 2 MSRs at Washington, and 6 multi-faced PARs.

and (d) at agreed test ranges. Testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be
* prohibited.

Corollary Limitations

The same corollary limitations against the upgrading of SAMs, including the ABM radar limitations, ** would apply as in the case of the zero level ABM limitation. The advance notification of allowed defensive systems would be extended to include allowed ABM deployment. ***

Verification

Verification would be by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.

- * The OSD and JCS Representatives believe no restrictions should be placed on ABM R&D flight tests and confidence firings.
- The JCS Representative believes no limitation should be placed on mobile ABM systems; the OSD Representative believes land-based mobile ABMs should not be limited.
- ** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be a limitation on ABM radars.
- *** The JCS Representative does not favor the requirement for advance notification, as noted earlier.

5. Development Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Limitation

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic missile systems, and for space missions, would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 125 launchers.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Verification would be facilitated by agreement to provide a list of such launch facilities and their locations, but this would not be mandatory.*

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations **

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational.*** This category would be defined as

* The JCS Representative believes such declaration of facilities should be mandatory.

** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be bomber limitations.

*** The OSD Representative believes the numbers above should be specified, rather than expressed in terms of "currently operational" numbers.

The JCS Representative believes that if bombers are to be limited, the numbers indicated should be specified.

presently comprising B-52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The US at present has 527 B-52 bombers; the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)*

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

No limitations would be placed on armament of any kind carried by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems

* The OSD Representative believes that, as a separate and additional category, medium strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising Badger, Blinder, and FB-111 bombers. (The US now has 33 FB-111's and is building to 76; the USSR has 1,275 Badger and Blinder bombers.) He would also include 50 additional Bear aircraft used in naval reconnaissance in the heavy bomber total.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-38-

specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs. Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.*

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements

Limitations

There would be no limitations on MIRVs, nor on qualitative improvements of strategic missile systems except as specified in provisions outlined above.

8. Verification

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option B would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of mandatory

* The JCS Representative believes that if bombers were to be limited, air defenses should be limited also or the viability of a limited bomber force could be challenged by an extensive defense build-up.

~~TOP SECRET~~

corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions
compatible with our verification capabilities. *

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework

* The JCS Representative believes that while primary reliance would be placed upon national means of verification, in addition to the mandatory corollary restraints on-site inspection should be sought in those circumstances and for those limitations where necessary for verification of compliance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-40-

of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event neither party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

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Option C: "Comprehensive II" Agreement1. ICBMs and SLBMsLimitations

The aggregate total of ICBM and SLBM* launchers would be limited to 1,710. ** At the present time, the Soviet Union has operational 1,272 ICBMs--of which 222 are SS-9's--and 288 SLBM launchers, for a total of 1,560. However, others under construction would if completed raise the total to nearly 2,000. A ceiling of 1,710 represents the US total, and would mean that the Soviets could complete roughly half of what they now have under construction. In order to avoid Soviet completion of all its SS-9's under construction--60--we would seek an understanding that completion would be approximately proportional

* The JCS Representative believes that instead of specifying SLBM launchers, "sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers" should be specified throughout the discussion of limitations in this section. This would allow inclusion of strategic offensive ballistic missiles mounted on surface ships within the mix.

** The JCS Representative believes that as an alternative or starting position we should suggest the formula "a total equal to the number operational as of a specified date (e.g., July 1, 1970)."

within classes of launchers under construction, so that the Soviet "SS-9 ceiling" within the 1,710 total would be 250.*

Within the ceiling of 1,710 launchers, SLBM launchers could be substituted for existing fixed land-based ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.** Existing SLBM launchers could be replaced by other SLBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

ICBM launchers could not be relocated or modified in externally observable ways.***

Deployment and testing of land-mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be prohibited.****

Deployment and testing of strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships would be prohibited.***** Strategic

- * The OSD Representative believes we should also specify that after some given date in 1970 no more than 250 missiles greater than 65 cubic meters in volume would be permitted (in effect, forcing Soviet replacement by small missiles or reduction of the 220 SS-7 and SS-8 missiles on launchers).
- ** The JCS Representative believes there should be interchangeable two-way freedom to alter the mix between fixed land-based and sea-based launchers.
The OSD Representative believes that the sequence of possible permissible reductions of land-based ICBM launchers should be specified, requiring phasing out of older ICBMs first.
- *** The JCS Representative believes that there should be no restriction on relocation of ICBM launchers.
The OSD Representative would prefer to say ICBM launchers could not be enlarged, but externally observable changes which would not enlarge the launcher would be permitted.
- **** The OSD Representative believes testing and deployment of land-mobile ICBMs should not be banned.
- ***** The JCS Representative, as noted earlier, believes strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships should not be banned.
The OSD Representative believes testing of such systems should not be banned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-43-

offensive missiles mounted on waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited.

There would be no limitation on replacement of ICBM missiles by other ICBM missiles.*

ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers. ICBMs, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as part of the total number of ICBM/SLBM launchers. (The Soviets have deployed 40 SS-11 ICBMs in one MRBM and one IRBM complex, and are so deploying another 40 at those complexes.)

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.**

Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would be considered as part of the allowed total number of launchers.

* See the first footnote of the OSD Representative on the preceding page.

** The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe testing of this system should be limited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-44-

Corollary Limitations

Several supporting corollary limitations would be included in order to facilitate verification.

No additional MR/IREM silos (beyond the 135 extant) would be allowed, since ICBMs could be retrofitted into such launchers, and this might elude detection.

No mobile missile of length greater than twelve meters and diameter of one and one-half meters or TELs for such missiles would be allowed, in order to prevent claims that an ICBM was a shorter-range permitted missile.

There would also be agreed procedures for notification and implementation of permitted launcher destruction and replacement, in order to ensure verification of changes in the mix of launchers.

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

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2. MR/IRBMsLimitations

The number of MR/IRBM launchers would be limited to the number currently operational (the USSR has 650; the US has none). Relocation of MR/IRBM launchers or externally observable modifications of such launchers would be prohibited. Deployment and testing of land-based mobile MR/IRBMs would be prohibited, and any operational would be destroyed.*

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intermediate or medium range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.*

Missiles of medium and intermediate range would be defined as missiles with a maximum range greater than 1,000 and less than 5,000 kilometers.

Corollary Limitations

Limitations would be placed on the size of mobile missiles and TELs for such missiles, including some with range capabilities of less than 1,000 kilometers, in order to insure against

* The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe that limitation should be placed on testing of these missile systems.

evasion of the ban on mobile MR/IRBMs. Such missiles (with nosecone) would be limited to a length of twelve meters and a diameter of one and one-fourth meters.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

If Soviet opposition to limitations on MR/IRBMs remains adamant, we should, subject to consultation with our NATO Allies on changing our position, be prepared to agree to set aside or defer limitations on MR/IRBMs, in exchange for appropriate Soviet concessions. Those restrictions on MR/IRBMs pertinent to insuring ICBM limitations are, however, separately specified as corollary limitations integral to the ICBM/SLBM limitations, and would continue to be maintained.

(New MR/IRBM silos would still be banned. Mobile offensive missiles below the size limits required for the ICBM corollary restriction would, however, be allowed if the MR/IRBM limitation were set aside.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-47-

3. SLCMs

Limitations

Submarines and associated launchers for SLCMs would be limited to those currently operational (the USSR has 348 launchers; the US has none).^{*} Substitution of SLBM launchers for SLCM launchers would not be permitted.

Corollary Limitation

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

We would initially seek the above limitation on SLCMs, but would be prepared in the negotiations to set aside limitations on SLCMs in exchange for some appropriate Soviet concession.

* The JCS and OSD Representatives believe we should seek an agreed number, so that the US would have the option of building up to 348 SLCM launchers.

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4. ABMs

Two alternatives for ABM limitation under this option are considered: zero or NCA levels.

(a) Zero ABM Level Limitation

Deployment of ABM launchers would be prohibited, and existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its existing Moscow Galosh ABM defenses. Specifically, the USSR would within three months of the time the agreement came into effect dismantle the Dog House radar, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four Try Add radar complexes, and the 64-launcher complex around Moscow. (Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces; launchers would be dismantled by removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch pads. Interceptors could be used for R&D testing.)* The US would also propose that the Soviets dismantle the uncompleted Hen House radar near Sevastopol. The Soviets

* The OSD Representative believes that all interceptors should be destroyed.

could keep the Skrunda and Olenegorsk large early-warning and tracking Hen House radars, and the Sary Shagan and Mishelevka early-warning, test range and space-track Hen House radars in Siberia, some faces of which face the Chinese missile threat, including portions of those radar complexes still under construction.*

The US would cancel Safeguard deployment. No existing US radars would be destroyed. We could retain or replace the three large BMEWs early-warning radars, and the large phased-array space-track radar at Eglin AFB, Florida (as well as the MSR ABM test radar at Kwajalein). This would provide rough equivalence of early-warning radar coverage to the two sides.**

- * The OSD Representative believes the USSR must dismantle all the Hen House radars, except for the radar faces at Sary Shagan and Mishelevka not facing the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean for space-tracking, and believe we should be prepared to give up the BMEWs in exchange.
- ** The JCS Representative would permit Soviet retention of all the Hen House radars for space-tracking and early-warning, in exchange for the US right to comparable radar coverage, but does not agree that the remaining radar systems above are comparable.
- The OSD Representative also does not agree that the remaining radar system above are comparable.

(If the Soviets insisted on building the Sevastopol radar for early-warning, the US would retain the right to build a radar or radars providing comparable additional coverage for early-warning.)

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual antiaircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role.* Apart from agreement on the disposition of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to an ABM system, as specified above, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. Non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by agreed criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan). (For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array

* The JCS Representative does not believe that limitations on ABM radars are feasible, and therefore does not believe that ABM radars should be limited.

radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; it would then not be necessary to apply other criteria. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist that an application of other criteria appropriate to the situation rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role.)

ABM research, development, and testing would be permitted. All flight-testing would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight-tests, (b) not more than 25 per year, (c) on not more than 10 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges.*

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM", but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side will declare its systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not

* The OSD and JCS Representatives believe no restriction should be placed on ABM R&D flight-testing.

include antiaircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk. *

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Corollary Limitations

There would be a ban on flight-testing of SAMs in an ABM mode.

- * The JCS and OSD Representatives believe this understanding would have to be sufficiently broad to encompass not only pure ABM systems, but also ABM capabilities of SAMs.
- ** If this approach is adopted, the OSD Representative believes the following constraints would be mandatory:
 1. All phased-array radars over $5M^2$ except those designated as ABM are prohibited without prior notice or understanding as to purpose and location.
 2. New aerospace interceptors except those designated as ABMs (and their launchers) which are larger than $1M^3$ are prohibited.
 3. The performance of existing aerospace interceptors except those designated ABMs, cannot be increased by more than 20% in range, acceleration, burnout velocity or payload, and cannot have nuclear warheads.
 4. The numbers of each type of presently deployed SAM radars and interceptors cannot be increased by more than 20% beyond those currently under construction.
 5. SA-5 radars and interceptors cannot be deployed closer than 50 miles of the largest 200 Soviet cities and the SA-2 components within 10 miles.
 6. Non-phased-array radars greater than $10M^2$ combined total aperture, except those designated as ABM, cannot be equipped so as to be able to track ICBMs and SLBMs.
- ***- The JCS Representative believes on-site inspection would currently be required to verify the ban on SAM flight-testing in an ABM mode.

In this option, we would also seek a prohibition on the deployment of new types of SAM systems and changes in the externally observable characteristics of existing SAM systems. If this broad restriction proved non-negotiable, we would seek limitations on SAM radar elements relevant to possible SAM upgrade: SAM radars constructed in the future would be limited to uncovered dish-type mechanically-steered non-phased-array radars.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed SAM systems. ^{**}

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the above corollary ^{***} limitations.

The US can verify the dismantling of the existing Soviet ABM system as described herein.

- * The JCS and OSD Representatives would delete the restriction on upgrading SAM radars.
- ** The JCS Representative would delete this provision on advance notification.
- *** The OSD and JCS Representatives believe that under this option on-site inspection of radars suspected of being able to track RVs, of SAM systems, and to ensure dismantling or destruction of elements of the ABM system would be required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-54-

(b) NCA Defense ABM Level Limitation

Deployment of ABMs would be limited to those appropriate to a defense of the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington). One hundred ABM launchers of any type would be permitted, together with associated radars.*

The Soviet Union would retain its present radars and ABM launchers, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated radars around Moscow. (We would seek the dismantling

* The JCS Representative believes the limitation should read "Ballistic missile defense would be limited to no more than 100 launchers and to no more than 100 interceptors; there would be no limitation on ABM radars."

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of the Sevastopol Men House, as in the case of the zero ABM level, with the same alternative fall-back of a comparable radar or radars for the US as a counterpart if Sevastopol is retained.)

The US would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising one PAR, one MSR, and 100 ABM launchers centered on a defense of the Washington, D.C., area (but covering a large area of the eastern United States).*

The provision with respect to future non-ABM radars outlined in the discussion of zero ABM levels (on pp. 50-51 above) would apply.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual antiaircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

ABM research, development and testing would be permitted. In addition, confidence firings would be permitted. All such ABM interceptor flight tests and confidence firings would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 30 per year, (c) on not more than 15 launchers,

* The OSD Representative believes that the equivalent system would be 100 interceptors, 2 MSRs at Washington, and 6 multi-faced PARs.

and (d) at agreed test ranges. Testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.*

Corollary Limitations

The same corollary limitations against the upgrading of SAMs, including the ABM radar limitations, ** would apply as in the case of the zero level ABM limitation. The advance notification of allowed defensive systems would be extended to include allowed ABM deployment.***

Verification

Verification would be by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.****

- * The OSD and JCS Representatives believes no restrictions should be placed on ABM R&D flight tests and confidence firings.
- The JCS Representative believes no limitation should be placed on mobile ABM systems; the OSD Representative believes land-based mobile ABMs should not be limited.
- ** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be a limitation on ABM radars.
- *** The JCS Representative does not favor the requirement for advance notification, as noted earlier.
- **** The JCS and OSD Representatives believe that under this option on-site inspection would be required for radars suspected of being able to track RVs, and for SAM systems.

5. Development Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Limitation

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic missile systems, and for space missions, would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 125 launchers.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Verification would be facilitated by agreement to provide a list of such launch facilities and their locations, but this would not be mandatory.*

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations^{**}

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational.*** This category would be defined as

* The JCS Representative believes such declaration of facilities should be mandatory.

** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be bomber limitations.

*** The OSD Representative believes the numbers above should be specified, rather than expressed in terms of "currently operational" numbers.

The JCS Representative believes that if bombers are to be limited, the numbers indicated should be specified.

presently comprising B-52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The US at present has 527 B-52 bombers; the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)*

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

No limitations would be placed on armament of any kind carried by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems

* The OSD Representative believes that, as a separate and additional category, medium strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising Badger, Blinder, and FB-111 bombers. (The US now has 33 FB-111's and is building to 76; the USSR has 1,275 Badger and Blinder bombers.) He would also include 50 additional Bear aircraft used in naval reconnaissance in the heavy bomber total.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-59-

specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs.

Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements
in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.*

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

- * The JCS Representative believes that if bombers were to be limited, air defenses should be limited also or the viability of a limited bomber force could be challenged by an extensive defense build-up.

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7. MIRVs

Limitations

The deployment of MIRVs and MRVs would be prohibited. Any MIRVs or MRVs that were already deployed would be withdrawn from operational status. (There should be a specific exception permitting the present deployment and confidence fringe of Polaris A-3 missiles, on the grounds that they are well known to have no multiple target capability.)

Corollary Limitations

Flight-testing of MIRVs and MRVs would be prohibited.* This ban would cover any type of system (e.g., bus, P-ball, rail) which could permit independent targeting of multiple RVs.

In order to prevent flight-testing not distinguishable from MIRV-related tests or in which MIRV components could be tested, the following kinds of flight-testing would be prohibited: post-boost and atmospheric maneuvering by ballistic

* The OSD Representative does not believe MIRV and MRV flight-testing should be prohibited.

missiles and RVs; multiple RVs; RV dispensing mechanisms; and
*
endo-atmospheric penetration aids.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means in
conjunction with the corollary measures outlined above. **

- * For a discussion of the types of tests to be banned under an agreement which prohibits MIRV flight-testing, see the MIRV Panel Report, page 6.
- The JCS and OSD Representatives believe exo-atmospheric penaids and multiple payload space flights should also be prohibited, if any such corollary limitation is placed on flight-testing.
- ** The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe that a MIRV deployment ban could be verified without extensive and intrusive on-site inspection. If on-site inspection were not available, they believe that a MIRV deployment ban is not verifiable, and that a flight-test ban would be ineffective in controlling such a ban. If, however, it were decided to attempt to verify a MIRV ban through limitations on flight-testing, they believe a wide range of flight-test activity would need to be banned (see the previous footnote).

ACDA Proposed Addition to Option C

8. Qualitative Limitations

There would be a ban on the flight-testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive ballistic missiles, and on the flight-testing and deployment of previously flight-tested types with improved accuracy or throw weight, in accordance with the following provisions.

Flight-tests of strategic offensive ballistic missiles would be limited to pre-announced confidence or training firings of previously tested types of missiles on agreed ranges, except that developmental flight-testing of modifications of missiles which had been previously tested with MIRVs or MRVs (Poseidon, Polaris, and Minuteman III) would be allowed in order to permit deployment of those missiles with single RVs. Any changes in flight-testing procedures which tended to conceal or disguise the missile being tested, or the data obtained from the test, would be prohibited.

These flight-test constraints would be in addition to those necessary for a MIRV ban.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, assisted by the above-noted corollary flight-test restrictions. The general verification considerations for the MIRV ban in Option C are also applicable to these qualitative limitations.

The Department of State Representative agrees with ACDA that further limitations on flight-testing as noted herein would be desirable as a means of reinforcing flight-test restrictions in support of a MIRV ban and for placing substantial inhibitions on improved accuracy and increased throw-weight of Soviet missiles, but he does not believe that the US should seek an explicit ban on deployment of missiles with throw-weight increases and accuracy improvements at this time.

9. Verification

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option C would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of mandatory corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions compatible with our verification capabilities.*

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustment within the framework

* The JCS Representative believes that while primary reliance would be placed upon national means of verification, in addition to the mandatory corollary restraints on-site inspection should be sought in those circumstances and for those limitations where necessary for verification of compliance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-64-

of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event neither party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Option D: A "Reduction" Agreement

This option would provide for limitations and reductions phased over a seven-year period.

1. ICBMs and SLBMsLimitations

The aggregate total of ICBM and SLBM* launchers would be limited to 1,710.** At the present time, the Soviet Union has operational 1,272 ICBMs--of which 222 are SS-9's--and 288 SLBM launchers, for a total of 1,560. However, others under construction would if completed raise the total to nearly 2,000. A ceiling of 1,710 represents the US total, and would mean that the Soviets could complete roughly half of what they now have under construction. In order to avoid Soviet completion of all its SS-9's under construction--60--we would seek an understanding that completion would be approximately proportional

* The JCS Representative believes that instead of specifying SLBM launchers, "sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers" should be specified throughout the discussion of limitations in this section. This would allow inclusion of strategic offensive ballistic missiles mounted on surface ships within the mix.

** The JCS Representative believes that as an alternative or starting position we should suggest the formula "a total equal to the number operational as of a specified date (e.g., July 1, 1970)."

within classes of launchers under construction, so that the Soviet "SS-9 ceiling" within the 1,710 total would be 250.*

Within the ceiling of 1,710 launchers, SLEM launchers could be substituted for existing fixed land-based ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.** Existing SLEM launchers could be replaced by other SLEM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

ICBM launchers could not be relocated or modified in externally observable ways.***

Deployment and testing of land-mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be prohibited.****

Deployment and testing of strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships would be prohibited.***** Strategic

- * The OSD Representative believes we should also specify that after some given date in 1970 no more than 250 missiles greater than 65 cubic meters in volume would be permitted (in effect, forcing Soviet replacement by small missiles or reduction of the 220 SS-7 and SS-8 missiles on launchers).
- ** The JCS Representative believes there should be interchangeable two-way freedom to alter the mix between fixed land-based and sea-based launchers.
The OSD Representative believes that the sequence of possible permissible reductions of land-based ICBM launchers should be specified, requiring phasing out of older ICBMs first.
- *** The JCS Representative believes that there should be no restriction on relocation of ICBM launchers.
The OSD Representative would prefer to say ICBM launchers could not be enlarged, but externally observable changes which would not enlarge the launcher would be permitted.
- **** The OSD Representative believes testing and deployment of land-mobile ICBMs should not be banned.
- ***** The JCS Representative, as noted earlier, believes strategic offensive missiles mounted on surface ships should not be banned.
The OSD Representative believes testing of such systems should not be banned.

offensive missiles mounted on waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited.

There would be no limitation on replacement of ICBM missiles by other ICBM missiles.*

ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers. ICBMs, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as part of the total number of ICBM/SLBM launchers. (The Soviets have deployed 40 SS-11 ICBMs in one MRBM and one IRBM complex, and are so deploying another 40 at those complexes.)

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.**

Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would be considered as part of the allowed total number of launchers.

* See the first footnote of the OSD Representative on the preceding page.

** The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe testing of this system should be limited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-68-

Corollary Limitations

Several supporting corollary limitations would be included in order to facilitate verification.

No additional MR/IIRBM silos (beyond the 135 extant) would be allowed, since ICBMs could be retrofitted into such launchers, and this might elude detection.

No mobile missile of length greater than twelve meters and diameter of one and one-half meters or TELs for such missiles would be allowed, in order to prevent claims that an ICBM was a shorter-range permitted missile.

There would also be agreed procedures for notification and implementation of permitted launcher destruction and replacement, in order to ensure verification of changes in the mix of launchers.

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-69-

Reductions

The initial ceiling of 1,710 would be reduced by 100 launchers each year over seven years. After January 1, 1978, the ceiling would be 1,000 total ICBM and SLBM launchers.

Reductions within the ceiling would be accomplished by phasing out ICBM launchers in the order in which they became operational. (With this stipulation, the US would phase out launchers in the following sequence: 150 silos at Malmstrom, Wing I; 54 Titan II's and 150 silos at Ellsworth, Wing II; 150 silos at Minot, Wing III; 150 silos at Whiteman, Wing IV; 60 silos at Warren, Wing V. The Soviets would phase out launchers in the following sequence: SS-7's and SS-8's, then in parallel SS-9 and SS-11 launchers -- approximately one SS-9 group of 6 launchers for every 20 SS-11 silos.)

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-70-

2. MR/IRBMs

Limitations

The number of MR/IRBM launchers would be limited to the number currently operational (the USSR has 650; the US has none). Relocation of MR/IRBM launchers or externally observable modifications of such launchers would be prohibited. Deployment and testing of land-based mobile MR/IRBMs would be prohibited, and any operational would be destroyed.*

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intermediate or medium range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.*

Missiles of medium and intermediate range would be defined as missiles with a maximum range greater than 1,000 and less than 5,000 kilometers.

Corollary Limitations

Limitations would be placed on the size of mobile missiles and TELs for such missiles, including some with range capabilities of less than 1,000 kilometers, in order to insure against

* The JCS and OSD Representatives do not believe that limitation should be placed on testing of these missile systems.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-71-

evasion of the ban on mobile MR/IRBMs. Such missiles (with nosecone) would be limited to a length of twelve meters and a diameter of one and one-fourth meters.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

If Soviet opposition to limitations on MR/IRBMs remains adamant, we should, subject to consultation with our NATO Allies on changing our position, be prepared to agree to set aside or defer limitations on MR/IRBMs, in exchange for appropriate Soviet concessions. Those restrictions on MR/IRBMs pertinent to insuring ICBM limitations are, however, separately specified as corollary limitations integral to the ICBM/SLBM limitations, and would continue to be maintained.

(New MR/IRBM silos would still be banned. Mobile offensive missiles below the size limits required for the ICBM corollary restriction would, however, be allowed if the MR/IRBM limitation were set aside.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. SLCMsLimitations

Submarines and associated launchers for SLCMs would be limited to those currently operational (the USSR has 348 launchers; the US has none).^{*} Substitution of SLBM launchers for SLCM launchers would not be permitted.

Corollary Limitation

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

We would initially seek the above limitation on SLCMs, but would be prepared in the negotiations to set aside limitations on SLCMs in exchange for some appropriate Soviet concession.

* The JCS and OSD Representatives believe we should seek an agreed number, so that the US would have the option of building up to 348 SLCM launchers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-73-

4. ABMs

Any of the alternative ABM levels examined in other options could be combined with the ICBM reduction feature of Option D: zero ABM level, NCA defense level, or Safeguard level.*

* The Representatives of the Department of State, ACDA, and CIA believe that in keeping with the idea of reductions, and consonant with the strategic implications of this Option, a zero or NCA defense ABM level is preferable. The OSD Representative would prefer the aerospace defense alternative he described in connection with the area defense provided in Option A and the broad NCA defense suggested in his footnote in Option B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Development Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Limitation

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic missile systems, and for space missions, would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 125 launchers.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Verification would be facilitated by agreement to provide a list of such launch facilities and their locations, but this would not be mandatory.*

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations **

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational.*** This category would be defined as

* The JCS Representative believes such declaration of facilities should be mandatory.

** The JCS Representative does not believe there should be bomber limitations.

*** The OSD Representative believes the numbers above should be specified, rather than expressed in terms of "currently operational" numbers.

The JCS Representative believes that if bombers are to be limited, the numbers indicated should be specified.

presently comprising B-52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The US at present has 527 B-52 bombers; the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)*

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

No limitations would be placed on armament of any kind carried-by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems

* The OSD Representative believes that, as a separate and additional category, medium strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising Badger, Blinder, and FB-111 bombers. (The US now has 33 FB-111's and is building to 76; the USSR has 1,275 Badger and Blinder bombers.) He would also include 50 additional Bear aircraft used in naval reconnaissance in the heavy bomber total.

(See the following page.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-76-

The OSD Representative suggests that, providing the Soviets agree to remove the SS-9's first in the reduction of ICBMs, the US would agree to reduce its total number of operational B-52's by at least 40 by the end of each year for five years starting in 1971. Thereafter the total number of US heavy and medium bombers would not exceed 325. The Soviets would not have to reduce their bomber force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-77-

specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs. Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.*

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements

Limitations

There would be no limitations on MIRVs, nor on qualitative improvements of strategic missile systems except as specified in provisions outlined above.

8. Verification

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option D would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of mandatory

* The JCS Representative believes that if bombers were to be limited, air defenses should be limited also or the viability of a limited bomber force could be challenged by an extensive defense build-up.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-78-

corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions
compatible with our verification capabilities. *

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework

* The JCS Representative believes that while primary reliance would be placed upon national means of verification, in addition to the mandatory corollary restraints on-site inspection should be sought in those circumstances and for those limitations where necessary for verification of compliance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-79-

of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event neither party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, seven years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

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